Bold new approach to Afghanistan, or wrong direction?

KABUL, Afghanistan — “I never thought I would miss George W. Bush,” laughed a Western diplomat in Kabul last week.

He was speaking only half in jest. In the three months since Barack Obama announced his “new strategy” for Afghanistan, the rosy hopes with which he was greeted in January have darkened considerably.

It could hardly have been otherwise: Expectations were so high for the young president that anything short of daily miracles would most likely have seemed a letdown. But while Obama still commands a large reserve of trust and respect in Afghanistan, there is a growing skepticism about his Afghan policy, which for many seems a study in contradictions.

He has said openly that there is no military solution to the problem, but the mainstay of his plan is a significant increase in troops.

He has said that our one goal in Afghanistan is to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but the truth is that Osama bin Laden and his band of global jihadists scampered over the border to Pakistan in 2001, right after the U.S.-led invasion. There they sit, spinning their plans in relative peace, while U.S. soldiers, unable to confront Islamabad, continue to punish the Afghan Taliban for a crime they did not commit.

The lofty rhetoric of the Bush years, during which “nation-building” shared the spotlight with the “Global War on Terror,” has been largely abandoned in favor of “stabilization.” Some call it realism, others see it as a cynical desertion of human rights and democracy.

Obama’s administration has unrolled a major initiative in “strategic communications” — designed to counter the Taliban’s propaganda offensive.

“We cannot let men on motorcycles or flatbed trucks monopolize the debate,” said a high-ranking U.S. official, speaking off the record. “Our message is complex, yet simple. It is: ‘The United States is here to help. We are not occupiers. And the Taliban are not great leaders of the faithful.’”

But while specialists in “psyops” argue over the wording of carefully planned, feel-good stories, Afghan television is showing photographs of a seven-day-old baby boy shot in a raid by U.S. Special Forces. No amount of “messaging” is going to erase that image, or convince Afghans who have lost loved ones that the killings are in their best interests.

The Taliban are not winning the propaganda war; we are losing it.

Obama first abandoned, then suddenly reaffirmed support for, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, raising suspicions in Kabul that the United States was making back-corridor deals.

Of course no one ever said it would be easy. Obama faces almost insurmountable challenges in Afghanistan: His own Special Envoy to the region, Richard Holbrooke, told a security conference in Munich that he had “never seen anything like the mess we have inherited,” adding that it would be tougher than Iraq.

But even allowing for the difficulties, Obama’s first steps in Afghanistan seem to be going in the wrong direction.

 An ill-considered effort to arm local men against the insurgents has been almost universally condemned within Afghanistan. It is called the Afghan Public Protection Program — AP3 for short.

“Don’t call them militias,” warned an official from the U.S. Embassy.

The terminology is important: Armed groups known as militias terrorized the population during the civil war years, in the mid-1990s. But whatever the label, many question the wisdom of placing guns in the hands of poorly trained and poorly paid locals, especially given Afghanistan’s universal corruption problem and deepening ethnic divides.

A local journalist in Wardak, site of the first AP3 experiments, explained: “In our village, we know who is who. We know where the Taliban are, where the government supporters are, and who belongs to other factions. We all get along. But now some of us are being given guns to hunt others in the community.”

It is unlikely to contribute greatly to stabilization.

Much of the problem stems from a failure to understand Afghanistan. According to Vice President Joe Biden, up to 70 percent of the Taliban are not fighting for ideology — they are looking for a bit of money in a cash-strapped economy. But rather than invest in development, which could generate jobs and deprive the Taliban of their major recruiting tool, the United States is pouring enormous resources into waging war with young boys who are just trying to support their families.

When Obama took over, many hoped for a radical change in policy for Afghanistan, a strategic departure that could cut the Gordian Knot. Those who live and work in Kabul waited impatiently for the new president to unveil his plan.

On March 27, the long-awaited strategy was presented: more troops, more military operations, more violence. In other words, a dead-end policy newly packaged as a major initiative.

“It is just more of the same,” sighed on old Afghan hand. “Much, much more.”