War by other means, Part 4: The law of unintended consequences

U.S. Army First Sergeant Todd Sullivan (R) with C Troop 1-71 CAV walks among Afghans during a patrol in the village of Gorgan in Dand district, south of Kandahar, June 20, 2010. (Denis Sinyakov/Reuters)

KABUL, Afghanistan — When a 13-year-old boy asked for admittance to Abdullah’s wedding feast, the groom thought it only hospitable to let him in.

He did, however, think it strange for this young, uninvited guest to be swathed in a blanket-like shawl, or “patu,” given the sweltering summer heat. 

Rather than extending felicitations, the young boy darted into the center of a courtyard where the male guests were eating dinner, according to eyewitnesses of the attack. 

Seconds later, a massive explosion rocked the night. Dead bodies lay on the carpets spread under the pomegranate trees. Cries and moans could be heard from the injured. Blood soaked into the ground in this remote village in the Arghandab Valley in Kandahar Province. 

At least 50 people died in the June 9 attack, according to official estimates; local residents say the total was over 80, with more than 90 injured, including the groom. The June 9 attack in Nagahan was, by any measure, one of the worst of Afghanistan’s brutal suicide attacks, and certainly among the cruelest.

The groom, Abdullah, who like many Afghans goes only by his first name, and at least 12 of the men who were killed in the attack were members of a local tribal militia that sought to protect the village against the Taliban. The militia was also part of a little-known U.S. initiative known as the Local Defense Initiative (LDI) to arm local tribes in the fight against the Taliban in exchange for generous reconstruction projects. 

Afghan leaders, U.S. military officials and tribal elders believe the boy was a suicide bomber sent to target the members of this U.S.-backed militia and the families who benefit from development projects attached to the militia’s service. 

The attack seems to underscore what many aid and development experts believe is the peril of imposing military strategy into the realm of aid and development. The approach can often serve to create divisions and increase hostilities, these critics say, as it appears to have done in the horrific incident Nagahan.

The dramatic resignation of Gen. Stanley McChrystal as top commander of forces in Afghanistan last week occurred in the context of a deep division in the U.S. war effort between the U.S. State Department and the Pentagon over how best to straddle this line between the civilian side of aid and development and the military strategy of effective counterinsurgency. Those divisions between the civilian side and the military and the high stakes for Afghans and Americans and their allies alike in getting the balance right are perhaps one of the greatest challenges facing Gen. David Petraeus as he heads to Afghanistan to replace McChrystal at this pivotal moment in the war in Afghanistan.

Nagahan was the village chosen by U.S. Special Forces in 2009 for a pilot project of the “Local Defense Initiative,” known by its military acronym LDI. It is part of a focused counterinsurgency strategy in areas surrounding Kandahar province, the birthplace of the Taliban, aimed at winning hearts and minds. The Kandahar region is the center of the escalating war effort against the Taliban and a military offensive that is set to get underway in the coming weeks.

The notoriously secretive Special Operations Forces in charge of the program were reluctant to comment on the Nagahan incident, or, in general, on LDI. They were certainly not ready to link the wedding bombing to their initiative; instead, they sought to highlight the incident as a further justification for the program, which they now seem to be calling “village stability platforms” (VSP).

“There is no conclusive evidence to determine why the bomber decided to take so many innocent lives,” said an unidentified Special Forces spokesman, responding in writing through the press office of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

“However, the wedding bombing typifies why more and more Afghans are rejecting Taliban ideology; they appear tired of the senseless violence and ready to risk their lives to bring peace and stability to their villages. The concept of village stability platforms is gaining acceptance and momentum among Afghan citizens and we don't think the wedding bombing will alter that course.”

LDI is one of several efforts in Kandahar to protect local villages and thereby persuade the population that they are better off with the Afghan government backed by U.S. and NATO forces than they are with the Taliban insurgency, which has deep roots and wide support in the area.

That idea will almost certainly become a much harder sell in Nagahan following the wedding bombing.

This village, which was hailed as a model of success for LDI and the militias it supports, has suddenly become the embodiment of the risks involved for locals who participate in the U.S. military’s initiative.

It is still unclear exactly who was behind the Nagahan attack; but whether it was the Taliban, despite their vociferous denials, or whether it was due to local rivalries stirred up by the largesse that Nagahan was receiving from the U.S. forces, few are in doubt that the deaths of dozens of local residents are a direct, if unintended, consequence of the U.S. attempts to use local tribes against the Taliban.

The LDI project has provoked numerous protests from Afghan officials, from worried experts, and from dozens of ordinary Afghans who remember the civil war years, when local militias preyed on the population almost at will.

At first, Nagahan seemed the perfect place for an LDI project. The village, in the lush green Arghandab district, was chosen because the community was united in its opposition to the Taliban, and had a strong local administration, say researchers familiar with Kandahar. It was also largely homogenous — most of Nagahan is from the Alikozai tribe.

Neighboring Khakrez also wanted an LDI project, according to Mathieu Lefevre, who produced a study of the LDI for the Afghanistan Analysts’ Network, a research institute based in Kabul.

The local elders in Khakrez, from the Popalzai tribe, were envious of the benefits heaped on Nagahan, he says. But Khakrez lacked the social cohesion and strong local government of Nagahan, and the U.S. forces were reluctant to get involved. This, writes Lefevre, was a significant source of tension in the area.

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghanistan/100625/us-aid-afghanistan-taliban-4-qaeda