Connect to share and comment

Opinion: Beware of Greeks buying ships

How secret Greek military spending and Cold War thinking, helped push the eurozone to the brink of disaster

A marine and machine gun from the Greek Frigate HS PSARA are reflected in the ship's dials as it patrols the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden in search for Somali pirates, March 8, 2009. (Fouad Juez/Reuters)

NEW YORK — In the final moments of Stanley Kubrick’s brilliant Cold War farce "Dr. Strangelove," the American president and his military advisors are evacuating the war room, having bumbled with the Soviet Union into a full exchange of nuclear weapons that will destroy most life on earth. As they head to their subterranean bunker, the hawkish Gen. Turgidson (played by George C. Scott) has a brainstorm about the world survivors will emerge into a century later when the fallout dissipates.

“I think we should look at this from the military point of view,” he says. “I mean, supposing the Russkies stash away some big bomb, see. When they come out in a hundred years they could take over!

Something similar appears to have happened in Greece with regard to its military budget. In spite of outward appearances that its age-old disputes with Turkey were on the mend, Greece apparently hid €8.7 billion in military spending between 1997 and 2003. This may not sound like Armageddon. But now, in part because of this kind of accounting, the European Union is facing the gravest financial crisis in its long history.

Ancient feuds and military aid

Following the 1974 Turkish-Greek crisis over Cyprus — a dispute which remains unresolved to this day — the U.S. Congress instituted a special 7:10 ratio with regard to military aid to Greece and Turkey. At the time, both countries were ruled by military juntas, and the Soviet watched with glee as the nations which comprised NATO’s southern flank lunged at each other’s throats.

Crisis after crisis repeatedly brought the two to the brink of war – over Cyprus in the 1970s, a Turkish plan to drill for oil in the Aegean in the 1980s, and over disputed Aegean islands about every four to five years.

For these reasons, well into the 1990s the U.S. Congress insisted on maintaining the relative balance of power, ensured that for every $10 of aid that went to Turkey, $7 went to Greece.
Starting in the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration began arguing against this formula, citing Turkey’s much higher strategic value and downplaying the risks of an actual shooting war between two NATO allies. Congress refused to budget, citing repeated dog-fighting incidents between Greek and Turkish warplanes.

Ultimately, however, the 1991 Gulf War changed the game. With the Cold War newly over, the Greeks in line to join the (then)-European Community, Turkey’s strategic location and influence in many of the newly independent Soviet states prompted the U.S. to open the taps. The 7:10 ratio went by the wayside with little fanfare — except, apparently, in Greece.

Improving relations, dwindling clout

The end of the Cold War vastly diminished Washington’s interest in this regional dispute, and while Turkey’s star rose, Greece’s own once-powerful lobby in Washington lost its strategic argument and became just another advocate for the interests of a significant American immigrant group.

Perhaps not coincidentally, episodes of Greek-Turkish skirmishing also dwindled following the end of the Cold War. Greece’s long quest to join the eurozone — denied in 1999 — may also have played a role in moderating its behavior.